

JIHADISM IN INDONESIA: POSO ON THE EDGE

Asia Report N°127 – 24 January 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	i
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. TANAH RUNTUH AND JI	3
A. JI TRAINING.....	3
B. HASANUDDIN COMES TO POSO	5
III. FALSE LEADS	7
A. BOTCHED MURDER PROSECUTION	7
IV. THE ARRESTS OF HASANUDDIN AND HARIS	9
V. THE TIBO EXECUTIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH.....	11
VI. THE 22 OCTOBER CLASH IN TANAH RUNTUH.....	13
VII. THE MOST-WANTED LIST AND THE LIMITS OF PERSUASION.....	15
VIII. THE 11 JANUARY RAID AND ITS AFTERMATH	16
IX. POSO DEVELOPMENTS AND JI.....	18
X. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD.....	19
APPENDICES	
A. MAP OF INDONESIA	21
B. MAPS OF POSO & MOROWALI DISTRICTS AND CENTRAL SULAWESI PROVINCE	22
C. MAP OF POSO CITY	23
D. DPO (WANTED LIST) FROM POSO.....	24
E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP	27
F. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2004	28
G. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES	30

JIHADISM IN INDONESIA: POSO ON THE EDGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After eight months of trying to induce surrenders, the Indonesian police have conducted two major raids this month in Poso, Central Sulawesi, to arrest a group of men, most local members of the terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), wanted for a range of bombings, beheadings and drive-by shootings. Peaceful efforts had clearly failed but the high death toll from the second raid has turned the wanted men into victims. A jihad that has been largely directed against local Christians could now be focused on the police as a *thoghut* (anti-Islamic force) and give a boost to Indonesia's weakened jihadi movement. The urgent task now is for the government to work with Muslim leaders to explain in detail who the suspects were and why force was used. It also should examine how police operations were conducted to see if further measures could have been taken to prevent casualties. Authorities likewise need to begin addressing a wide range of local grievances.

Just after dawn on 22 January 2007 Indonesian police moved in on a quiet Poso street. They found themselves confronting not just the men they sought but a much larger and heavily armed resistance, including mujahidin from elsewhere in the Poso area and several from Java. By the end of the day, one policeman and fourteen others were dead, and several on both sides wounded. Some two dozen were arrested as they fled.

This was the second attempt in two weeks to forcibly arrest more than twenty men who had been on a wanted list since May 2006. On 11 January, police raided the houses where they were believed to be hiding, killing two, arresting six and seizing a sizeable collection of weapons.

There were already indications that the suspects and their sympathisers, in an effort to enlist mujahidin from outside their own group, were portraying police operations as an attack on Muslims. Any deaths in the course of the operations would strengthen their hand, and they now have at least sixteen men from the two raids whom they will almost certainly claim as martyrs, or seventeen, counting a young man killed in October 2006 in a clash with police. One danger now

is that the jihadis will try to take the anti-*thoghut* war outside Poso, targeting police in other cities.

Another danger is that the JI faction that opposes bombings of Western targets and sees Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia's most wanted terrorist and the man believed to be behind some of Indonesia's deadliest bombings, as a deviant, will see this jihad as legitimate.

Finally there is the possibility that some of the fugitives might try to get to Java to join forces with Noordin. The Poso mujahidin are experienced in targeted assassinations, a tactic that has not been used outside conflict areas. While the likelihood of an operational link-up between the two groups is slight, the addition of even one experienced sniper to Noordin's group could be lethal.

Even if these dangers are avoided and the remaining suspects are arrested, no one should be complacent that the violence in Poso is over. There is too much unfinished business from the communal conflict there that reached its height in 2000-2001. Some mujahidin speak of the need to have children quickly so that a new generation of fighters can be produced. Even as the government continues its security operations, a more comprehensive approach to the conflict is urgently needed.

This report examines how one neighbourhood in Poso became a JI stronghold and how a small group of men managed to terrorise the city for three years before their identities became known. It looks at the links between the JI structures in Poso and Java and the local grievances and resentments driving the ongoing violence and analyses the way forward.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Indonesia:

1. Establish an independent commission of inquiry, including community leaders from Poso, on the 11 and 22 January police operations and mandate it to:
 - (a) determine whether the justified operations were properly conducted, in particular whether any of the deaths could have been avoided given that the suspects were heavily armed; and
 - (b) work quickly and disseminate its final report widely.
2. Work with Islamic leaders, using all media but especially Muslim websites and web-based discussion groups, to explain to the Indonesian public why the Poso suspects were targeted, what their crimes were and why force was used, so that it is not left to the police to explain their own actions.
3. Establish an independent fact-finding body, composed of all the stakeholders in a peaceful Poso and with full power to question civilian and military authorities, to examine grievances left over from the 2000-2001 conflict and suggest ways to heal them, with particular attention to the killings at the Walisongo Pesantren and surrounding villages in late May-early June 2000 and the Buyung Katedo killings in 2001.
4. Set up a body directly under the president, with a mandate to document the needs of those who are still displaced and work out an employment program that can absorb the local mujahidin.
5. Publish and adopt the full set of recommendations made by the fact-finding committee set up after the 22 October 2006 clash between police and mujahidin supporters in Poso.
6. Work with local leaders and donors to develop a genuinely community-based police force in Poso that would not have to rely on outside reinforcements and ensure that allegations of grave ill-treatment by security forces are immediately and transparently investigated.

Jakarta/Brussels, 24 January 2007

JIHADISM IN INDONESIA: POSO ON THE EDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Poso, the city in Indonesia's Central Sulawesi province that has been wracked by communal conflict and jihadi attacks, may have become the centre of a new jihad against the police. On 22 January 2007, Indonesian police trying to arrest a group of local jihadi suspects wanted in connection with a string of bombings and murders found themselves confronted by a heavily armed resistance, consisting not just of the Poso fugitives – most of whom were local members of the terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – but also of many other mujahidin who had come to their assistance, including some JI members from Java. In the ensuing battle, one policeman and fourteen* others were killed. While most of the dead appear to have had ties to militant groups, at least three, including a teenager, appear to have been ordinary residents caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. More than twenty men were arrested.

The targets of the 22 January operation were 24 men from the Tanah Runtuh neighbourhood of Poso who had been on a most-wanted list (DPO) since May 2006. They were believed responsible for almost every major high-profile crime in Central Sulawesi over the last three years, many of which were attacks on local Christians but some against police and suspected police informers. After an unsuccessful eight-month effort to work through local Muslim leaders to persuade the men to give themselves up, police on 11 January raided several houses where some of them were believed to be hiding. They killed one man on the list and a second who turned out to be a JI member from Solo who had been teaching in Poso since 2004. Six men were arrested, but all those at the top of the wanted list escaped. Community anger rose to a fever-pitch, and that afternoon a mob beat a passing policeman to death.

The 11 January raid seems to have precipitated an influx of mujahidin into Tanah Runtuh to help defend their fellow fighters. Some were from Mujahidin Kayamanya, also known as Mujahidin KOMPAK, several of whose members had been wrongly accused of JI crimes in recent years. One of those killed in the 22 January operation, for example, was Muhamad Safri Dekuna alias Andreas, who voluntarily turned himself in to police in June 2005 when he learned he was being accused of a crime he did not commit, only to be beaten and tortured so badly that he required hospitalisation.

The presence of outside mujahidin, including from Java, complicates the Indonesian government's task enormously. The local problems are daunting enough. Effective law enforcement, including the arrest of known criminals, is necessary but insufficient to end the violence in Poso. Addressing local grievances, including through the formation of a genuinely independent fact-finding team that can explore some of the divisive issues of the past, and providing economic opportunities for those caught up in the conflict must be part of the package. But if the problem has already mutated into a broader jihad against *thoghut* (anti-Islamic forces), the government will have to move quickly and mount an all-out effort to see that militants do not gain more support.

The two police raids will be portrayed as unfair and discriminatory action against beleaguered Muslims, who were merely defending themselves from arbitrary arrest, instead of a justified operation to apprehend a group of criminals who have terrorised Central Sulawesi for years. That said, the conduct of the operations also needs to be examined as fully and transparently as possible, especially as the death toll has been so high.

Until the 11 January raid, police seemed to be making headway in one of Indonesia's most sensitive areas. After years of misreading the situation, dismissing jihadi violence as common crime and failing to understand the extent or danger of militant networks, they had finally identified the perpetrators of all major acts of violence in the past three years. Aided by liberal infusions of cash, they were beginning to get the reluctant cooperation of militant leaders. They were going out of their way – sometimes extraordinarily so –

* Based on additional information received by Crisis Group after publication of this report, this number was corrected (from fifteen to fourteen), as were related figures and statements, on 30 January 2007.

to persuade suspects to surrender, and some did. They warned repeatedly that there was a limit to their patience, and they would use force if persuasion did not work. Nevertheless, the wanted criminals became seen overnight as victims of police brutality because of the way the raid was carried out.

Both the anger against the police and the perception of the mujahidin as victims are far stronger in the aftermath of the 22 January raid. Even those in Poso who freely acknowledge the need for the JI suspects to be arrested are furious at how the raid was handled and convinced that there was no need for the death toll to be so high. If reports of a death in custody prove true, the last shreds of support for the police in the Muslim community will evaporate.

Even if the security situation deteriorates, it is important to try and keep the military out of the picture. Highly counterproductive hostility between the military and police has been a hallmark of the Poso conflict since the beginning, and fighting between the two erupted again the day after the 11 January raid, in an unrelated incident. Local soldiers are not beyond trying to provoke local residents to attack the police, which is the last thing Poso needs.

Why should events in a sleepy town in central Sulawesi have such dire implications? A hint lies in the identity of two men killed by police. Ustadz Mahmud was shot in the 22 January raid. An Afghan veteran who also used the name Ubay, he was the son-in-law of Adung, a man who served as the chief aide to JI's founder, Abdullah Sungkar. Adung headed JI's Mantiqi I, the division covering Malaysia and Singapore, until his arrest in 2004 and is currently serving a seven-year sentence in Jakarta.

Ustadz Riansyah alias Rian was killed in the 11 January operation. He was a JI member from the group's subdivision (*wakalah*) in Solo, Central Java. As Abdul Hakim, he went to Afghanistan in 1987 in the same cohort as some of Jemaah Islamiyah's top leaders, including Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, one of the Bali bombers. As Eko, he became the target of a police hunt in September 2003 after explosives and ammunition that he helped hide were seized in a raid in Karanganyar, Central Java. He then disappeared from sight. In late 2004, according to Poso sources, he showed up in Tanah Runtuh with his wife and seven children and gave lectures in the area, while supporting himself by selling Muslim clothing.

The ties between JI and the Tanah Runtuh community were of long standing, and the men the police were trying to catch on 11 January included some of the first from Poso whom JI had trained at the height of

the fighting between Muslims and Christians. While police had known the identities of the local JI leaders for some time, it took a series of arrests after the second Bali bombings to put the pieces of the puzzle together and realise that those same men were responsible for many of the crimes that were either unsolved or had been attributed to others, including:

- ❑ the killing of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church treasurer and his driver on 16 November 2003;
- ❑ the drive-by murder of Palu prosecutor Fery Silalahi in May 2004;
- ❑ the murder of a Christian army officer's wife in July 2004;
- ❑ the murder of Protestant pastor Susianti Tinulele in July 2004;
- ❑ the beheading of village head Carminalis Ndele in November 2004;
- ❑ the bombing in Poso's central market, killing six, in November 2004;
- ❑ the bombing of the Imanuel Church in Palu, December 2004;
- ❑ the armed robbery of some \$50,000 in Poso government salaries in April 2005;
- ❑ the bombing of Tentena's central market, killing 22, in May 2005;
- ❑ the killing of Budianto and Sugito, two alleged informers, in August 2005;
- ❑ the killing of policeman Agus Sulaeman in October 2005;
- ❑ the beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005;
- ❑ the bombing of a pork market in Palu killing seven, in December 2005; and
- ❑ the attempted murder of the Poso police chief in a drive-by shooting in January 2006.¹

Even after police arrested three of the key perpetrators of the above crimes in May 2006, violence continued, with several more bombings and robberies and the drive-by murder of the Central Sulawesi Protestant

¹ They were also responsible for a few other crimes that police had solved, including the murder of a Balinese journalist in 2001 and the armed robbery of a cigarette truck and shooting of the driver in 2004. Andi Ipong and Yusuf Asapa were sentenced to nine years in July 2006 for the murder.

Church head, Reverend Kongkoli, on 16 October 2006. It was clear that many more men were involved.

The jihadi violence in Poso over the last three years has been driven by local factors: a sense of unaddressed grievances left over from the 1998-2001 conflict, a desire for revenge for Christian attacks on Muslims in 2000-2001, a sense that the Christian community remains a threat, and for a few, the lack of anything better to do. But since the Indonesian government finally – and many would say belatedly – decided to arrest the perpetrators, the police have become the Tanah Runtuh group's Enemy No.1.

This could have serious ramifications in three ways. Firstly, as opposition to the police in Poso is increasingly portrayed as a fight of Muslims against a *thoghut* (anti-Islamic) government, the weakened jihadi movement in Indonesia could be energised. Some mujahidin from Java and elsewhere began arriving in Poso after an earlier clash with police in October 2006, and more have come since. Many who see bombings of Western targets as illegitimate will have no such problems with a jihad against a *thoghut*.

Secondly, mujahidin could take the war against the police outside Poso to other Indonesian cities. Finally, some of the Tanah Runtuh fugitives could try to get to Java, where shelter and support would be available through the JI network, or even further afield. Many still see Mindanao as the refuge of choice. Once in Java, it is not impossible that a few could join with fellow fugitives like Noordin Mohamed Top. So far, jihadis have restricted targeted assassinations and drive-by shootings to conflict areas; if even one experienced marksman from Poso links up with Noordin, the result could be lethal.

II. TANAH RUNTUH AND JI

The Tanah Runtuh neighbourhood, in the south-western corner of Poso city, is a small complex of about eleven houses, a mosque and, since 2001, the Ulil Albab Pesantren for girls. Bounded on two sides by hills and to the south by the Poso River, it was the site of a landslide in 1998, hence its name, meaning "fallen earth". The complex is home to Haji Adnan Arsal, a prominent religious leader and employee of the local government religious affairs office. From the outbreak of the conflict, his house became the logistics depot for the Muslim side, where food and medicine were collected and assistance and sometimes shelter provided to Muslims displaced by the violence. He set up the Ulil Albab school and its counterpart for boys, al-Amanah, about nine km away in Landangan, as a way of taking in students from a school that was the site of a massacre of Muslims in 2000, the Walisongo Pesantren.²

Haji Adnan also helped recruit and organise the local mujahidin. It was he whom JI leaders sought out to offer their services after the Walisongo massacre and its aftermath. The offer was accepted, and in June 2000, JI began to send some of its most experienced trainers to Poso on regular rotations. One who arrived that August for a six-month tour of duty was Ustadz Rian, the man killed in the January 11 raid.³

A. JI TRAINING

Until JI's arrival, Poso's Muslim fighters had largely used traditional weapons: spears, stones, knives and fish bombs. The JI trainers, mostly Afghanistan veterans, taught them how to use firearms and a wide range of other military skills in a camp outside Ampana, in what is now the district of Toja Una-Una.⁴ Some 35

² For discussion of earlier phases of the Poso conflict, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°103, *Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*, 13 October 2005 and Asia Report N°74, *Indonesian Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 2004.

³ Crisis Group interview, 13 January 2006. Rian alias Eko alias Abdul Hakim was in the same group of trainers with the head of Wakalah Solo, Ichsan Miarso, head of the al-Alaq publishing house. After the six months, he returned to Solo.

⁴ This was the camp referred to by former Indonesian intelligence head Hendropriyono in December 2001, when he said Spanish authorities had told him Spanish al-Qaeda suspects had visited a camp in Kapompa village, Tojo subdistrict. Tojo subdistrict later became the district of Toja Una-Una. See Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit., p. 12.

people took part in the first training (*tadrib*), including notably Lilik Purnomo alias Haris, whose arrest and interrogation in May 2006 led to the identification of those responsible for almost all of Poso's major unsolved crimes.⁵ Two outstanding graduates of that first session, Brur alias Iin and Suroso, then became trainers (*mudarib*) themselves. Their top students included Basri, a man who escaped as police closed in on his parents' house in the 11 January raid, and who may be the most dangerous of the lot.⁶ Two of his younger brothers, Udin and Toto, were killed after the 22 January raid. Udin reportedly was not shot but died in police custody.

After the December 2001 Malino accords that established an uneasy peace between Christians and Muslims in Poso, JI tapped ten of these early recruits for what was in effect a special operations unit. Called the "Team of Ten" (*Tim Sepuluh*), it comprised the cream of these early recruits. As the conflict began to wane, this unit dispersed but its individual members went on to become some of Tanah Runtuh's most important operatives.

In addition to the military training, JI provided religious instruction focused on jihad through a program known as Proyek Uhud, or the Uhud Project, designed to build a mass base and develop a territorial structure for JI in the Poso-Palu area through religious outreach.⁷ The project was run by Mustafa alias Abu Tholut, as head of Mantiqi III, the JI administrative division that covered Sulawesi, Sabah, and the southern Philippines. It involved sending JI preachers (*da'i*) to Poso, six of whom arrived in late 2000 and were sent to Tanah Runtuh, where Adnan Arsal was building one of his *pesantrens*. They included:

⁵ Others in the first cohort were Nizam Khaleb, who became a key figure in JI's Palu *wakalah* (Wakalah Uhud) and is serving a six-year sentence in Palu for having helped hide the Bali bombers; Yusuf Asapa, convicted in 2006 for the 2001 killing of a Balinese journalist; and Nanto alias Bojel, still at large and sought by police, suspected of taking part in the schoolgirl beheadings.

⁶ Brur alias Iin, 28, is a suspect in the 2004 Palu prosecutor killing. Suroso left the Poso area several years ago. Basri is known as an expert sniper, is suspected of involvement in many of the major Tanah Runtuh crimes. Others in Basri's cohort included Andi Ipong, sentenced in the same case as Yusuf Asapa, above; Rahmat alias Jindra, arrested in May 2006 for suspected involvement in the killing of an army officer's wife but later released; and Iwan Asapa alias Ale, Yusuf's brother sought in connection with the Palu prosecutor murder. A third Asapa brother, Idrus, was killed in the 22 January raid.

⁷ Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah* (Jakarta, 2005), p. 91.

- Sahal Amri alias Narto alias Sunarto alias Athoillah, a graduate of the JI-affiliated al-Muttaqien Pesantren in Jepara. In 2000 he became part of a religious outreach team set up by JI's Central Java *wakalah* in Semarang and later that year was sent to Poso to oversee the establishment of new *pesantrens*.⁸ He was a *mu'alim* (religious instructor) in Tanah Runtuh and Kayamanya, another militant stronghold in Poso, until his arrest in February 2006. After being detained for a week in Jakarta, he was released without charge and returned to Poso, but because Tanah Runtuh members suspected he had revealed key information to police, he was forced to leave and is thought to have returned to Java.
- Achmad, appointed by Adnan Arsal to run the al-Amanah Pesantren. He became deputy head of the Islamic forum of Poso (FSPUI) and also head of an Islamic law implementation task force, Satgas Chairul Ummah.⁹
- Yasin alias Utomo, who like Sahl led religious instruction in the Tanah Runtuh and Kayamanya areas and sold clothes for a living. He reportedly attended Pesantren al-Muttaqien, the JI school in Jepara. After being wounded in the defence of the suspects on 22 January, he turned himself in to police.
- Hibban alias Iban, who became a teacher at al-Amanah and Ulil Albab. He was reportedly killed in the 22 January raid.
- Anshori, who was assigned to organise the Muslim resistance in Pendolo and Pandajaya in Pamona Selatan subdistrict bordering South Sulawesi. He stayed there until February 2006, when, after Sahl's arrest, he felt unsafe and moved to Tanah Runtuh.
- Sahid, believed to be from Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's *pesantren* in Ngruki, Solo. Originally from Aceh, he was a long-term resident of Java who gave religious instruction in Tanah Runtuh.

⁸ Testimony of Subur Sugiyarto in the case of Sunarto alias Ustadz Sahl alias Ustadz Athoillah, date missing from Crisis Group copy but in February 2006.

⁹ Satgas Chairul Ummah was a task force designed to oversee implementation of Islamic law and fight vice. It was set up after the Malino accords to compete with a similar body established by Laskar Jihad called Task Force Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar. Some members of Chairul Ummah were secretly recruited into JI and were later implicated in an armed robbery of a cigarette company truck in 2004.

JI preachers continued to arrive over the next several years, including several with experience training or fighting in the southern Philippines.¹⁰ Most were married, brought their families and by and large earned their living selling Muslim clothes for women (*pakaian gamis*), including headscarves and chadours, and *pakaian koko* for men, including above-the-ankle trousers. Some also sold perfume or engaged in other forms of petty trade.

The Uhud Project led to the establishment in 2000 of the first fully fledged JI subdivision in Central Sulawesi, Wakalah Uhud in Palu. (Until then, Palu had been part of a *wakalah* that also covered North Sulawesi.) By early 2002, it had about 45 members. In October 2002, a week after the Bali bombings, a JI executive meeting decided to establish a new *wakalah* in Poso. JI had plenty of members there but no one to give direction to their activities. In addition, JI leaders believed that Poso had the potential, through its agricultural wealth and the cacao boom, to replace Singapore and Malaysia as the income-generating area for the organisation.¹¹ Nasir Abas, then head of Mantiqi III, chose one of his star trainees from Mindanao, Slamet Raharjo alias Hasanuddin, to lead what became known as Wakalah Khaibar.

B. HASANUDDIN COMES TO POSO

Hasanuddin, originally from Wonogiri, Central Java, was then 30. He joined the Solo *wakalah* sometime in the late 1990s and in 1998 was sent for training to Camp Hudaibiyah, the JI military academy on the

grounds of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front's (MILF) Camp Abubakar. After graduation in February 2000, he was ordered by Nasir Abas and Mustafa alias Abu Tholut, his instructors, to assist the MILF, with which he fought for the next two years. He returned to Indonesia in September 2002 and a few weeks later was in Tanah Runtuh as the new leader of JI-Poso. Because he needed to establish his authority quickly, JI arranged his marriage to Adnan Aarsal's daughter, Aminah, in March 2003. He became secretary of the Ulil Albab orphanage at the *pesantren*, selling fried shrimp crackers for a living.¹²

The local mujahidin were in disarray at the time. Virtually all able-bodied men, from teenagers to the elderly, had declared themselves fighters during the conflict, and many had been recruited into organised militias; there was no distinction in terms of military expertise. Different neighbourhoods had different commands, with little coordination among them.

Shortly after Hasanuddin arrived in Poso, he began to impose order and discipline. He called up the members of the old Team of Ten, brought in men who had trained under JI but were now with other organisations or no longer active, began coordinating different militant groups in the area and revived Tanah Runtuh as the nerve centre of jihadi activity in Poso.

To strengthen their capacity, he divided the local mujahidin into two main groups, the military wing (*kelompok askari*) and the religious outreach wing (*kelompok dakwah*). The military wing was further divided into two levels according to competence and experience. The first, elite level included seven of the men who were targets of the 11 January raid – Basri, Brur alias Iin, Wiwin Kalahe alias Tomo, Hamdara Tamil alias Papa Isran, Iwan Asapa alias Ale, Nanto alias Bojel and Amril Ngiode alias Aat – together with two men now in custody, Andi Ipong and Yusuf Asapa. The latter had a brother who died after the 22 January raid; Wiwin was one of those arrested. Suroso, another man from the original JI military training course in 2000, was also part of this team, which was responsible for executing most of the major operations. The second level took on tasks that did not require combat skills, such as gathering intelligence and surveillance.

Ustadz Sahl coordinated the religious outreach team, which was also divided into two groups. One group of instructors (*mu'alim*) conducted weekly general religious study sessions (*ta'lim umum*) in mosques around the Poso area for about ten students at a time.

¹⁰ They included Lukman; Munsip (Munshif), who arrived shortly after Sahl; and Kholiq, who came in 2003. Kholiq, a Moro veteran, helped dispose of the murder weapons in the schoolgirl beheadings case. Rifki, a seller of Muslim clothes and perfume and sometime lecturer at al-Amanah, arrived in mid-2003; his wife teaches at Ulil Albab; Rian alias Eko alias Abdul Hakim arrived in late 2004. One of the most prominent late arrivals was Sanusi alias Ishak, from Tegal, Central Java, a graduate of JI's Mindanao training program in cooperation with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). He arrived shortly before Ramadan 2005 (around early October). A bachelor, he slept at the library of the Ulil Albab Pesantren and acted as its watchman. Hasanuddin maintains it was Sanusi who suggested giving an end-of-Ramadan "surprise" to the enemy, an idea that led to the beheadings of the schoolgirls a few weeks later. He had come to Poso earlier in 2004, then returned to Java. Testimony of Hasanuddin alias Hasan alias Slamet in case dossier of Hasanuddin alias Slamet Raharjo, 12 May 2006.

¹¹ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, 5 June 2006. The Malaysian and Singapore governments had by this time crushed their respective JI structures.

¹² Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, 5 June 2006.

A second group led more intensive, one-off training sessions (*dauroh*) for participants who had been hand-picked by *mu'alim* from the general sessions for commitment and competence. Because participants were brought in from several villages rather than a single mosque, the *dauroh* involved as many as twenty or 30. It could last from four days to a week and covered topics such as the nature of the *jama'ah* (community) to which they belonged; jihad; loyalty and disloyalty (*al-wala' wal bara'*); and leadership. Instructors would select their most capable students for the third stage (*tadrib*) or military training.

Advancement to *tadrib* could take six months to a year. Its graduates would then be placed in *askari* units of three to five, which became operational cells. A typical bombing operation involved four cells: one to prepare the materials, a second to make the bomb, a third to deliver it to the target and the fourth to detonate it. For security reasons, cells did not share information, so the makers of the Tentena bomb would not necessarily have known who would plant it.

Under Hasanuddin's direction, JI cooperated with other groups. The October 2003 attacks on the Christian village of Beteleme, for example, were carried out by Mujahidin Kayamanya, formerly known as Mujahidin KOMPAK, and another local group, but Tanah Runtuh helped with logistics and supplied the ammunition.¹³

After the Kayamanya leadership in effect collapsed in 2005, members were gradually brought under Tanah Runtuh's command, but there is some evidence that it is beginning to regroup.¹⁴

Long before the October 2005 beheadings, Hasanuddin initiated the idea of giving "presents" to the enemy for Christmas, New Year's and the end of Ramadan,

in the form of bombings, shootings or other attacks.¹⁵ He would call a meeting, suggest targets or ask for other options, and then develop plans, relying heavily on Haris. It was Hasanuddin who decreed in 2005 that all spies and informers had to be eliminated. At least four murders were the direct result: the August 2005 killing of Budianto and Sugito, two men from Poso who had provided information to police; their friend, Hasrin Laturupe, killed on 30 September 2005; and a police officer, Agus Sulaeman, killed on 12 October 2005.

All the Poso *wakalah*'s operations were financed locally, from four sources: a monthly levy on members' income; *fa'i* (robbery) of non-Muslims, the most spectacular of which was the \$50,000 in local government salaries in April 2005; donations; and cuts from contracts obtained through JI cadres strategically placed in local government offices.

¹³ For a discussion of the origins of Mujahidin KOMPAK see Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit., pp. 5-11. The group is based in the Kayamanya neighbourhood of Poso, just to the north of Tanah Runtuh. Initially trained by JI members, Mujahidin KOMPAK developed a distinct identity and did not have the same level of religious indoctrination as Tanah Runtuh members. It is now commonly known as Mujahidin Kayamanya.

¹⁴ According to one Kayamanya member, the leadership collapse was due to several factors. The May 2005 attack in Loki, West Ceram, Maluku in which several Kayamanya members were involved had caused many of their comrades to go into hiding. The group's KOMPAK patron, Abdullah Sunata, was arrested a month later. More attention to Poso by Densus 88 may also have been a factor. One question is whether the release from detention and return to Poso in December 2006 of a senior Kayamanya leader will lead to the group's reconsolidation.

¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, Palu, November 2006.

III. FALSE LEADS

Police had known the basic outlines of the JI structure in Poso and Hasanuddin's role in it at least since mid-2003, when Nasir Abas, the former JI leader, began working with them. They had arrested some Tanah Runtuh members in the past, notably Andi Ipong, who served a three-month sentence for a shooting incident in 2003. They were well aware that Adnan Arsal's *pesantrens* housed teachers associated with Ngruki and other JI schools.¹⁶ It is not clear why it took so long for them to gather evidence against Hasanuddin and others but several factors may have been involved:

- ❑ the poor capacity of the local police and the reluctance of Jakarta to acknowledge that the 2001 Malino peace accord, which was supposed to end the violence in Poso, was not working;
- ❑ the solidarity in the Tanah Runtuh community and unwillingness to provide information, evidence or witnesses to police and prosecutors;
- ❑ the influential position of Adnan Arsal and government nervousness about taking any moves that might generate a public backlash; and
- ❑ the plethora of other suspects involved in violence in Poso.

The killing of the Palu prosecutor, carried out by several Tanah Runtuh members including Dedi Parsan, one of the two who died in the 11 January raid, highlights the last problem in particular.

A. BOTCHED MURDER PROSECUTION

On 26 May 2004 Fery Silalahi, 46, was shot at close range by men on a motorcycle while leaving a church service in Palu. He had been the chief prosecutor in several high-profile terrorism cases. One involved three members of JI's Palu *wakalah* accused of hiding a minor suspect in the 2002 Bali bombing. They were

convicted but the convictions were overturned on appeal to the High Court in Palu. Silalahi refused to release them and appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the original convictions.

At the time of his death, he was in the process of prosecuting several men from Mujahidin Kayamanya for their involvement in a shooting attack on Christian villagers in Beteleme, Poso in late October 2003 in which two people were killed.¹⁷

Police suspicions immediately fell on the Kayamanya group, since they seemed to have a motive and, as the Beteleme attack proved, had access to guns. One member in particular, Sofyan Djumpai alias Pian, a local gang leader, had been a thorn in the side of the police for years and admitted freely that he had held a grudge since he failed the psychological test to enter the police academy.¹⁸

Pian had been involved in a string of crimes directed against Christians in Poso after 2000, several of them in collaboration with a Tanah Runtuh man, Andi Ipong. He was detained for three months for one of those crimes, a shooting in Sausu subdistrict, but was released in September 2003. Because of his notoriety, police suspicions were understandable. The problem was that he had not been in Palu on the day of the killing and could produce many witnesses to say so.

Nevertheless, police persuaded several Kayamanya members to testify that they had heard their comrades discuss the prosecutor's killing. On 15 August, Pian was arrested together with a Kayamanya colleague, Erwin Mardani.¹⁹ Under questioning over the next several days, Erwin testified that he had been present at a meeting on 23 May at which Kayamanya members had discussed targeting the prosecutor because he was handling the Beteleme cases. The meeting, he said, had been led by Hence, with Farid and Pian taking part. Erwin claimed to have seen the killers depart for Palu and said they received Rp.1

¹⁶ For earlier analyses of Ngruki, JI, and other JI schools see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°119, *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks*, 14 September 2006; N°63, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003; N°43 *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*, 11 December 2002; and Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°20 (corrected), *Al-Qaeda in South East Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network'*, 8 August 2002.

¹⁷ See Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

¹⁸ Interrogation deposition of Sofian Djumpai alias Pian, 16 August 2004 in case dossier of Sofian Djumpai.

¹⁹ Erwin Mardani alias Jodi alias Wiwin was tried and acquitted on charges of having helped hide Pian. He was released in March 2005 and made his way to Maluku, where he was one of two Poso men involved in an attack on a police post in Loki, West Ceram on 16 May. He was wounded and went back to Poso just before the Tentena bombing on 28 May and immediately was listed as a suspect. See Crisis Group Report, *Weakening Mujahidin Networks*, op. cit., p.14. He is at large and still wanted for the Loki attack, but played no role in the Tentena bomb, according to Tanah Runtuh sources.

million (about \$100) from the group's treasurer for the operation.²⁰ Prosecutors apparently never discovered that Hence was in Ambon and Farid in North Sulawesi at the time of the murder. Erwin and another alleged participant at the 23 May meeting retracted their testimony in court, saying they had been tortured.

There is no logical explanation for the suspects saying Hence and Farid were present other than that they were forced by police, who apparently were so convinced of the Kayamanya group's involvement that they built a case out of thin air – and forced testimony. No evidence placed Pian at the scene, and while he had a revolver with him when arrested, forensic evidence quickly showed that it was not the murder weapon.

Pian's trial started in January 2005 and continued for three months. In March, the prosecutor asked for a ten-year sentence for terrorism; the judges handed down an eight-month sentence for weapons possession. The prosecutor appealed, and the High Court increased the sentence to two years.

In the meantime, the police continued to hunt for Hence and Farid, still apparently convinced they were involved. In June and July 2005, they and the Kayamanya treasurer, Husen Simin Latima, were arrested in Central Java, as Densus 88, the counter-terror unit of the Indonesian police, pursued its hunt for Noordin Mohammed Top in the aftermath of the September 2004 Australian embassy bombing.²¹ Hence had gone to Ambon in late April 2004, and by the time he was ready to return at the end of the year, Pian was already under arrest and he knew Poso was unsafe for him. He went to stay instead with his in-laws in Sragen, Central Java in early 2005.²²

Farid, meanwhile, arrived in Ambon on 3 May 2004, shortly after Hence, and about a week later was invited to go to Mindanao for training. He and two others left Ambon in mid-May, and without returning to Poso, went to Tahuna, off the coast of North

Sulawesi, to await transport to Mindanao. On 23 June, he was arrested there for not having a proper identity card. He was detained for a few weeks, then required to report to the local police for another month, and in early August 2004, given the green light to go home. But Farid knew from the press that he was a suspect in the Silalahi killing so decided to go to Yogyakarta instead of returning to Poso.²³

Husen Simin Latima had been in central Java since his home in Poso was raided in November 2004, and he was arrested after it was established that he was in possession of the gun Hence had ordered. There was nothing to tie him to the Silalahi killing, and the fact that while in Yogyakarta he had been actively involved in plotting a murder of a Poso Christian was immaterial to the case.²⁴

The trials of Hence and Farid began in November 2005 and were still in process when the arrests that revealed the real perpetrators of the prosecutor's murder took place. In April 2006, both were acquitted of that crime and sentenced, on a firearms charge only, to twenty months in prison minus time served. They were released on 1 December. Husen was fully acquitted.

The entire process was a testament to poor policing and prosecution and left a residue of confusion, anger and resentment. Farid is reportedly one of several Kayamanya members who came to defend the Tanah Runtuh group against the police on 22 January 2007, but he escaped.

²⁰ Interrogation depositions of Erwin Mardani 18 August and 20 August 2004 in case dossier of Hence Malewa.

²¹ It turned out that Hence had ordered a gun from Abdullah Sunata, the same person who supplied one to Noordin.

²² Abdullah Sunata is serving a seven-year, terrorism-related sentence in Jakarta for weapons possession and withholding information about Noordin. Sunata was in Poso in 2003, when Hence ordered a gun from him. It took a while, but Sunata's courier, Purnama Putra alias Usman alias Tikus "The Mouse", delivered it in late February 2005 at the Islamic Centre in Solo, headquarters of KOMPAK-Solo. For more on Sunata's links to Noordin, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°114, *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks*, 5 May 2006, pp. 12-14.

²³ Interrogation deposition of Farid Podungge alias Wawan alias Nene alias Andre, in case dossier No Pol, BP/75/IX/2005 Dit Reskrim, 22 August 2005.

²⁴ While in Yogyakarta, Husen had discussions with Usman the Mouse, a KOMPAK operative, about killing the son of a hotel owner in Poso who was seen as a donor to the Christian side there. The young man was apparently also staying in Yogyakarta.

IV. THE ARRESTS OF HASANUDDIN AND HARIS

The second Bali bombs on 1 October 2005, followed a few weeks later by the schoolgirl beheadings in Poso, eventually led police to the real culprits. Just as they stumbled on to Hence and Farid in Central Java as they were investigating Noordin and Abdullah Sunata, they got an unexpected windfall on Poso while investigating the Semarang cell that had worked with Noordin in planning Bali II.

The link was Subur Sugiyarto alias Abu Mujahid, a Semarang man, now serving a life sentence, who brought his JI cell over to Noordin in early 2005 and provided critical logistical support to Bali II. Densus 88 police learned his identity in the course of a raid in Batu, Malang that killed Azhari Husen, Noordin's partner. They arrested him in January 2006, and questioning revealed that he had served on the *dakwah* team of the Central Java *wakalah* at the same time as Ustadz Sahl, the Tanah Runtuh teacher. When Sahl was sent to Poso, Subur was sent to Ambon, but the two remained in touch.²⁵

On 9 February 2006, Sahl was arrested in Tanah Runtuh and immediately brought to police headquarters in Jakarta to be confronted with Subur. Central Sulawesi's police chief announced that he was suspected of having ties to Noordin Mohammed Top.²⁶ The arrest caused an uproar in Poso. On 13 February, several hundred members of Muslim organisations there gathered at the district legislative council to demand the release of Sahl and two other Tanah Runtuh detainees and, for good measure, the prosecution of Denmark for publishing cartoons of the Prophet. Adnan Arsal denied Sahl had any links to terrorists, demanded evidence of wrongdoing, and complained his *pesantren* was being unfairly branded as a terrorist breeding ground. If police could find any evidence that the *pesantren* was teaching terrorism, they should close it, he said.²⁷

After a week, Sahl was released without charge and returned to Poso, where he addressed a large rally and spoke of the ill-treatment and torture he had suffered. But his Tanah Runtuh colleagues were not so sure.

They noticed that while he had been using an old model hand phone before his arrest, he returned with a new one with a built-in camera. They asked to see evidence of torture but there were no marks on his body. They became convinced he had betrayed them, and he left Poso shortly thereafter.²⁸

Fearing the consequences of his testimony, several mujahidin decided to move out of Tanah Runtuh temporarily. Among them were three top operatives, Lilik Purnomo alias Haris; Irwanto Irano; and Rahmat alias Jindra, who moved to Toli-Toli, some 700 km. northwest of Poso. Equipped with false identity cards, they made and sold shrimp crackers and generally laid low.

The desire of Rahmat's wife to see her husband was their undoing. Thanks to information from Sahl, police suspected Rahmat of involvement in the July 2004 murder of Helmy, the wife of an army officer, in Kawua, Poso. They followed Rahmat's wife when she tried to visit him, accompanied by two members of the Palu *wakalah*, Abdul Muis and Nano Sumarsono. All the men were arrested, the visitors as well as Haris, Irwanto and Rahmat. After a few days of interrogation in Palu, the latter three were flown to police headquarters in Jakarta. Abdul Muis, later to be picked up in the 11 January raid, and Nano were released.

Based on their information, police from Densus 88 on 8 May tried to arrest Taufik Bulaga alias Upik Lawanga, Tanah Runtuh's master bomb-maker, whose nicknames were "The Professor" and "Poso's Azhari", after the man who designed Noordin Top's bombs. Taufik had also reportedly been involved in Helmy's murder, as well as in a series of other crimes, including the Tentena bombing. Four policemen were tasked with the arrest and came into Lawanga, where Taufik lived, on two motorcycles. They seized and handcuffed him as he was leaving morning prayer at the Nurul Iman Mosque but he shouted for help. Someone ran out to bang an electricity pole, and a crowd came to the scene. The policemen panicked and departed, leaving their motorcycles and handcuffed prisoner behind. The angry crowd then burned the motorcycles.²⁹

That afternoon, the police chief of Poso and his entourage visited the neighbourhood to explain why Taufik was a suspect. Before they could speak, residents began to stone a police truck guarding the group, and all turned tail and returned to Poso.

²⁵ Indeed one question is whether Subur Sugiyarto ever asked for help from Sahl or other JI members from Java in recruiting Poso operatives.

²⁶ Ruslan Sangaji, "Terkait Jaringan Nurdin Top, Ustadz Sahl Ditangkap". See <http://ochansangadji.blogspot.com/2006/02/terkait-jaringan-nurdin-top-ustadz.html>.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Crisis Group interview, January 2007.

²⁹ Crisis Group interviews, November 2006; "4 Anggota Densus 88 Diserang Warga Poso", *Kompas*, 9 May 2006.

The next day, 9 May, Hasanuddin was arrested in Palu, as he was teaching recruits to fry shrimp crackers. He had been warned by his friends that it was unsafe to stay in Palu but he had ignored them.³⁰

Tanah Runtuh sources swear that until the arrest of Haris and Hasanuddin, Adnan Aرسال was genuinely unaware of the extent to which his followers – not to mention his son-in-law – were involved in crimes.³¹ They say he was not consulted or informed, although given his ties to JI and the preachers sent to his schools, it is hard to see how so much could be happening in his complex without his knowledge. In a move that suggests he did at least have suspicions, he reportedly called a meeting shortly after two NGO offices in Poso were bombed on 28 April 2005 and asked the mujahidin who was responsible for these and other terrorist acts (*siapa sebenarnya melakukan teror-teror selama ini*). If they were, they should be honest and tell him. They swore by Allah that they were not involved.³²

The word from Tanah Runtuh was that Adnan Aرسال felt betrayed once Hasanuddin and Haris confessed, with the latter giving detailed information on every crime he and his colleagues had committed, reportedly in exchange for the police agreeing to pay Rp.30 million (about \$3,000) of his debts. At one point, Haji Adnan reportedly said that if it was true members of his Tanah Runtuh group had beheaded the three students, their heads should be taken in return.³³ He began to be more cooperative with the police, who asked his assistance in apprehending the 29 suspects now on their wanted list (*Daftar Pencarian Orang*, DPO).

The man the police wanted even more than Taufik Bulaga was Basri. The son of a Javanese mother and Bugis father, he was 30, older than many of the other mujahidin, and made his living selling fish, poultry and vegetables. He was a petty thief and livestock rustler before the conflict and also played in a rock band. During the conflict, he became known as an expert marksman and sniper. He is suspected of involvement in the beheadings of the schoolgirls and of the Pindedapa village headman a year earlier, and in the shooting of Rev. Susianti Tinulele in July 2004, among many other crimes. Through Adnan Aرسال,

police hoped to negotiate a surrender but Basri refused.³⁴

Negotiations went on through June, July and August. At one point police reportedly offered to drop charges against those suspected of lesser crimes if they could get Basri and three or four others but the tactic did not work.

³⁰ Crisis Group interviews, November 2006.

³¹ Crisis Group interviews, December 2006.

³² Crisis Group interviews, October 2006. Crisis Group interview, Palu, December 2006. In fact, while those bombings almost certainly were carried out by Tanah Runtuh operatives, they reportedly were ordered not by the JI leadership but by a donor and contractor with ties to the mujahidin.

³³ Crisis Group interview, Palu, December 2006.

³⁴ Crisis Group interview, Palu, December 2006.

V. THE TIBO EXECUTIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

Then a major development changed the political dynamics. Early on 22 September 2006, the long-delayed executions of three Christian men accused of killing Muslims at the height of the Poso conflict were carried out. Fabianus Tibo, 60; Dominggus da Silva, 39; and Marinus Riwu, 48; were accused of leading and inciting Christian militias to murder Muslim men, women and children in Poso between 23 May and 1 June 2000. One massacre, on 28 May, of Muslim villagers who had taken shelter at a local *pesantren*, stands as the bloodiest single incident of the entire conflict. Tibo, da Silva, and Riwu were sentenced to death in 2001; after unsuccessful appeals for clemency to the High Court, the Supreme Court and the president, the executions were to take place in mid-August 2006. They were cancelled at the last moment, ostensibly so they would not interfere with local celebrations of Indonesia's National Day, but apparently because officials were worried about the security implications.³⁵

The case was followed avidly in Indonesia and around the world. Human rights groups argued that there were serious questions about the trial's fairness. Others said the three never should have been tried in Palu, where emotions were so high. Still others pointed out the discrepancy in sentencing: no Muslim arrested during the conflict had received the maximum sentence, and only a handful on either side of the conflict had been sentenced to more than five years.

Although many hardline groups protested vehemently when the execution was delayed in August, even more so when it was reported that the Pope had written a letter urging clemency, Adnan Arsal took a different stance. He came to Jakarta with the then head of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church in July to argue that Tibo's execution would hinder the investigation into who had ordered the massacres.³⁶ During his trial, Tibo had claimed that sixteen men, several of them influential local officials, were the masterminds but he was not able to produce evidence, and he had not had direct dealings with most of those he named. Nevertheless, investigation and prosecution of the sixteen became a top demand of militant Muslims.

It is not clear why there was such a rush to execute the three when there were so many questions about the case, but two political reasons were put forward, in addition to the attorney-general's legal argument that since all appeals had been exhausted, there was no choice but to proceed. One was speculation, prominent among advocacy groups in Jakarta and the international press, that the execution of Christians would make it easier for Indonesia to execute the Bali bombers. Another, advanced by a few senior officials, was that there was no way the violence in Poso would stop as long as the killers of Muslims were alive. Executions would be an important signal to the Muslim community that their demands for justice were taken seriously, after which everyone could move on.³⁷

It was a naïve misreading of the situation in Poso. The day after the executions, violence erupted on the Trans Sulawesi highway near the village of Taripa, south of Poso. Two Muslim fish traders from Masamba, North Luwu in South Sulawesi were returning home from Ampana in their pick-up truck when they passed through the town. Police say they had warned everyone in the area not to travel through the towns where emotions were high but the warnings were ignored. Arham Badarudin, 32, and Wandu, seventeen, were seized by villagers. Their bodies were discovered three days later.

Police tried to move swiftly to defuse the rising tension but on 29 September, when the provincial commander and his entourage tried to go to Taripa to talk with the villagers and identify the perpetrators, they were stoned and four of their vehicles set alight. Police eventually arrested seventeen men and said they would be charged with ordinary crimes. But with a view toward addressing a political imbalance – thus far the anti-terrorism legislation had been used only against Muslims – they decided to charge them all with terrorism.³⁸

Violence continued. On 30 September 2006, around 10 pm, a bomb went off in front of the Kawua church in Poso. An eyewitness said that soldiers goaded the bystanders into attacking police when they arrived, while for their part, five policemen ran toward the predominantly Muslim area of Sayo shouting "they're attacking!", with "they" understood as "Christians". Sayo residents went out to bang electricity poles,

³⁵ "Eksekusi Mati Tibo Ditunda", *Koran Tempo*, 11 August 2006.

³⁶ Back in Poso, however, he took part in rallies supporting the executions.

³⁷ Crisis Group interview, senior official in attorney-general's office, Jakarta, 12 March 2006.

³⁸ The decision to charge these men with terrorism illustrates the problems of applying the terrorism laws in a conflict area, where the dividing line between what constitutes terrorism and what constitutes an ordinary crime is often blurred.

summoning villagers for defence. For a while it looked as though the Kawua Christians and the Sayo Muslims would attack each other, but religious leaders managed to calm things down without loss of life.³⁹

Six more minor bombings took place during Ramadan, including one on 14 October at the office of the Poso district head. Then, on 16 October 2006, Reverend Irianto Kongkoli, the head of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church, was shot and killed at close range by gunmen on a motorcycle as he shopped with his family in Palu. This time, the police were certain that the gunmen were from Tanah Runtuh. Sources there say that Kongkoli had actually been the intended target when Rev. Susianti Tinulele was shot in July 2004. He had been scheduled to preach then, and Tinulele was a last-minute substitute.⁴⁰ Everyone immediately realised the gravity of the murder: Kongkoli was one of the best-known Christian figures in the province. If his killers were not caught quickly or police seemed less than determined to find them, resumption of communal fighting was not only possible, but likely.

Police believed that Basri, their top target, was one of the killers and that he was hiding in the Tanah Runtuh complex. Spokesmen at Indonesian police headquarters accused “Hasanuddin’s group” of the murder, and police made it clear to Adnan Arsal that if he did not turn over Basri, they would use force to get him.⁴¹ They were also worried about rumours circulating that bomb attacks were being planned to mark Idul Fitri and resolved to prevent them.⁴²

On 19 October, in recognition of how serious the situation had become, President Yudhoyono ordered three top police officials – the head of Brimob, the head of police operations and the former head of the Poso Special Command – to Poso, to join the deputy head of police investigations. It was a useful way of underscoring that no matter how complex the

problem, it was still the police, not the military, who were in charge.⁴³

³⁹ Eyewitness account provided to Crisis Group, October 2006.

⁴⁰ Crisis Group interview, December 2006.

⁴¹ “Penembak Pendeta Kelompok Hasanuddin”, *Radar Sulteng*, 17 October 2006, and “Kelompok Hasanuddin Dituding”, *Koran Tempo*, 18 October 2006.

⁴² Classified fact-finding team (Tim Pencari Fakta, TPF) report, 20 November 2006. Crisis Group obtained a copy missing the title page. The police noted that the bombers usually used motorcycles as their getaway vehicle and wanted to restrict movement.

⁴³ Under Soeharto, the authoritarian president who stepped down in 1998, internal security was the military’s responsibility. After he resigned, reformists succeeded in separating the police as a civilian law enforcement body from the armed forces to whom they had traditionally been the very poor cousin.

VI. THE 22 OCTOBER CLASH IN TANAH RUNTUH

On 22 October 2006, a clash between police and Tanah Runtu residents took place in which Saifudin alias Udin, a student at al-Amanah Pesantren, was shot to death in disputed circumstances. He was the younger brother of Haris, the JI operative arrested in May whose information had been so critical to subsequent arrests.

The incident unfolded as families were preparing for Idul Fitri, the celebration marking the end of Ramadan and Islam's biggest holiday. According to police, after rumours began to circulate of possible bomb attacks that night, paramilitary police (Brimob) were sent to patrol the streets and stop drivers of all vehicles to check identity cards. Around 9:30 pm, a patrol not far from Tanah Runtu stopped a motorcyclist. Instead of showing his documents, he ran, then banged an electricity pole to summon help. Everyone in the neighbourhood rushed out, and an angry group attacked the local police post, about 100 metres from the Tanah Runtu complex. The Poso police chief ordered the streets in the neighbourhood blockaded so the trouble would not spread. Residents saw this as the first step toward an assault on their complex and attacked police, still according to the police version. The police post was already heavily damaged, and some policemen were trapped inside. To rescue them, police sent in a Baracuda armoured personnel carrier, which came under fire.

According to the police, it remains unclear how Saifudin died, because the Tanah Runtu community would not allow an autopsy, and he was immediately buried.

Witnesses claim that police descended on Tanah Runtu, backed up by Brimob reinforcements from Jakarta and Kalimantan, some 700 men in all.⁴⁴ They say this was not an ordinary security patrol doing spot checks on vehicles; it was a planned operation against the Tanah Runtu complex because some of the Brimob men asked locals for directions to it. Local mujahidin banged electricity poles as the police came in, and the community rushed to their defence, hurling stones and other objects. After the Baracuda came to the aid of the trapped policemen, Brimob opened fire on the crowd, killing Saifudin. If there was shooting

from within the complex, they ask, why were no policeman injured?⁴⁵

A government fact-finding report says that gunfire from behind a building in the Tanah Runtu complex led community members to bang the poles, thereby mobilising a large crowd of people yelling "Allahu Akbar" (God is great) and using provocative language to further fan the flames. The electricity then went out. The report draws no conclusion as to who was responsible for the gunfire and says only that further investigation is needed.

The accounts agree that a mob destroyed the community police post in Tanah Runtu and burned a police truck and three motorcycles. The government report says that sixteen police were surrounded and 240 bullets "disappeared" from the police post. As police tried to defend themselves, they fired shots into the air and decided to evacuate the premises. The report, again without determining responsibility, states that the Baracuda vehicle used by the police showed marks of shooting, and its tires had been ripped by Molotov cocktails. Bullet holes were found in the houses of residents along the main street in Tanah Runtu.

That night, the homes of two local police officers were burned to the ground. One, according to the government report, had been threatened by Basri in June and July 2006; on his house were written the words "police are anti-Islam, infidels, traitors".⁴⁶

The next day, as masses turned out for the funeral procession bearing Saifudin's body to the burial ground, a group started throwing stones when they passed the house of a Brimob man. Brimob personnel opened fire, hitting a marcher, Mislam Aminuddin from Landangan, and a four-year-old child.

On 30 October, non-governmental organisations and Muslim groups in Poso, calling themselves the Anti-Violence Ummat Caucus of Central Sulawesi, gathered to demand that all Brimob reinforcements be withdrawn from the city. They claimed that Brimob had shot first; the police claimed locals had fired first. On the same day, Vice President Jusuf Kalla announced the establishment of a fact-finding team to investigate the October raid, to be led by Widodo, the coordinating minister for politics, law and security. It

⁴⁴ Crisis Group interview, Palu, December 2006.

⁴⁵ Crisis group interviews, December 2006. A detailed account from the Tanah Runtu perspective, prepared by the Forum Silaturahmi Perjuangan Umat Islam (FSPUI) in Poso, appears in *Sabili* magazine, 16 November 2006, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁶ In Indonesian, *Polisi thogut, kafir, pengkhianat*. See TPF fact-finding report, op. cit., p. 37.

consisted of police, army, and intelligence personnel and so was seen as not independent by NGOs and Muslim groups.

Nevertheless, the team produced a set of eminently sensible recommendations in its 20 November report – which unfortunately remains classified. Among other things, it:

- noted that the raid's timing was unfortunate, and the police should apologise to the community for disrupting Idul Fitri preparations;
- noted that Brimob personnel should focus on preventing conflict and avoid use of force or armed patrols that tend to increase community resentment;
- stressed the need for confidence building between police and public and recommended further investigation of the 22-23 October events;
- noted the demand for withdrawal of outside Brimob troops and recommended the creation of a local Brimob unit to develop better relations with the community, as well as a criminal investigation and intelligence unit, after which the outside reinforcements could be gradually withdrawn;
- recommended persuasion and negotiations to apprehend the 29 Tanah Runtuh suspects;
- suggested that any interrogations be in Palu rather than Poso, that suspects be accompanied by legal counsel, that family be permitted to visit at any time and that police avoid force during interrogations;
- urged better coordination between security forces and that in particular the rules governing when and how the military should aid the police in the field should be spelled out; and
- recommended evaluation of how the 2001 Malino accords had been implemented and urged emphasis on social rehabilitation, especially employment opportunities for victims of the conflict, return of the displaced, direct assistance to victims of violence, including reconstruction of homes, and speedier economic development.⁴⁷

Oddly, when Minister Widodo announced the team's findings in late November, he only referred to five: further investigation of the 22-23 October disturbances "that resulted in anarchic behaviour"; a security concept for Poso; better communication between

police and the public; firm measures toward the 29 suspects; and incentives for resolving the security problem.⁴⁸ He omitted all references to a broader approach to the problem, including social and economic measures, guarantees that suspects would be well-treated, evaluation of the Malino accords and the need for better army-police cooperation.

If the original recommendations had been announced and accepted, tensions might have been eased. They were not, and increasingly a more pressing question loomed: what to do if the persuasive approach failed.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ "TPF Poso dibubarkan, rekomendasinya ditindaklanjuti", <http://www.depkominfo.go.id/?action=view&pid=news&id=4112>.

VII. THE MOST-WANTED LIST AND THE LIMITS OF PERSUASION

The 22 October raid increased antipathy to the police and strengthened the resolve of the most-wanted not to give themselves up. It also complicated police relations with local Muslim leaders, including Adnan Arsal, who on a trip to Jakarta in early November, called for members of Muslim organisations to join together to wage a new jihad in Poso.⁴⁹

But Densus 88 intensified its efforts. It was naive to have thought that executing Tibo and company would reduce violence in Poso but it was not so implausible that arresting the 29 suspects, if done properly, would be a step toward peace. On 24 October, the police issued the wanted list so everyone could see who was suspected of doing what.⁵⁰ Adnan Arsal immediately complained that while he did not endorse the violence the men had been involved in, publication of the list made it seem like they were just perpetrators, whereas they were also victims of the conflict, and many had lost relatives in the May-June 2000 massacres. The police had to be fair – if they were going to take Haris's information and investigate everyone he mentioned, they also had to take Tibo's statement and investigate the sixteen.⁵¹ Nevertheless, he continued to serve as an intermediary between the police and the suspects, almost all of whom were still in Poso.

However, police pressure and persuasion seemed to be working, and several relatively minor figures on the list began to turn themselves in. The first was Andi Bocor alias Udin, 38, a sugar seller in Poso's Central Market, on 14 November. He was suspected in the 29 September 2005 shooting death of Hasrin Laturopo in Landangan, Poso Pesisir, the village where Adnan Arsal's al-Amanah Pesantren is located, but the police decided after questioning that he probably was not involved.⁵² His surrender was played up in the media, his good treatment and release a few days later even more so, when the police announced they were dropping all charges.

During the third week of November, the police sponsored a speaking tour around Central Sulawesi by Habib Rizieq, the Jakarta-based head of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). Known for its often violent attacks on places of vice and centres of "deviant" religious teaching, FPI had a strong following in the Poso area. Police hoped Habib Rizieq could persuade some local mujahidin to turn their energies into eradicating vice rather than attacking civilians. But they also hoped to enlist him in the effort to get the DPO suspects to give themselves up.⁵³ Accordingly, on 25 November, after a public religious lecture (*tabligh akbar*) to an audience of 3,000, Habib Rizieq joined lawyers from the Muslim Defence Team, Adnan Arsal and other local religious leaders in a closed meeting with the suspects' families. Several told him their relatives would not turn themselves in unless the cases of the sixteen men Tibo mentioned were prosecuted first.⁵⁴

That said, on 28 November, two more on the list, Ateng Marjo alias Iswanto and Abdul Nasir Doho, both suspected of involvement in the armed robbery of district government funds, turned themselves in. They were questioned for a week in Palu, then released on 4 December and flown back to Poso, again with great fanfare about how well they were treated.⁵⁵ Syahril Lakita alias Ayi and Upik Kokong turned themselves in on 6 December. They were suspected of planting a bomb at the Poso sports stadium on 3 August 2006, which exploded but caused no injuries. Upik had fled to Jakarta when the DPO was announced. Poso police gave his parents Rp.1.5 million (about \$150) to encourage him to return, and the Central Sulawesi police added another Rp.1.5 million. He returned, with his lawyer, at police expense.

No one else was prepared to follow suit; some of the suspects, in some cases strongly supported by their wives, said they would rather die as martyrs than surrender.⁵⁶ Police stepped up their courting of Adnan Arsal. On 18 December, they invited Haji Adnan and Dahlan, the father-in-law of Irwanto Irwano, to Jakarta together with other family members. They all went to see Irwanto, who was then still detained at police headquarters. It was an effort to show kindness and suggest that police would also ensure regular family visits for those on the wanted list if they surrendered. They also told Haji Adnan explicitly that

⁴⁹ "Haji Adnan Arsal Bakal Deperiksa Polisi", *Tribun Timur*, 6 November 2006.

⁵⁰ See Appendix D below.

⁵¹ Crisis Group interview, Palu, December 2006.

⁵² In fact Andi Bocor had not been active in the Tanah Runtuh group for a long time. Hasrin Laturopo was a friend of two suspected police informers who had been killed a few days earlier, also by the Tanah Runtuh group. He seems to have been guilty by association in their view: police denied he provided any information, while they readily admitted that his friends had.

⁵³ Crisis Group interview, senior police officer, Palu, 30 November 2006.

⁵⁴ Crisis Group interview, Palu, December 2006.

⁵⁵ "Dua DPO Poso Dilepas", *Radar Sulteng*, 5 December 2006.

⁵⁶ Crisis Group interview, Palu, December 2006.

they would provide Rp.50 million (about \$5,000) to the family of any suspect who gave himself up. He relayed the offer to the suspects on return but all rejected it.

The police said they would recommend lenient sentences to prosecutors and judges, and in cases where the suspects were charged with multiple crimes, reportedly offered them some choice of which they would be prosecuted for.⁵⁷ None of it worked. To the public, the police explained the suspects still feared ill-treatment, and if they only would talk to those who had turned themselves in, they would know this was groundless. The suspects' lawyers maintained fear was not the issue – it was the failure of the government to investigate the massacres of Muslims in 2000-2001.⁵⁸ But it was probably less complicated than either: these were men, several with long criminal backgrounds, who would rather fight it out than turn themselves over to anyone in the institution they long had regarded as the enemy.

Fearing violence, thousands of extra police were deployed to Poso to guard churches over the Christmas holidays but they passed without incident. In January 2007, police wrote handwritten letters to some of the suspects, appealing to them on religious grounds to turn themselves in, but by this time, it was clear that persuasion had reached a dead end.

VIII. THE 11 JANUARY RAID AND ITS AFTERMATH

On 10 January, the headline in the leading newspaper of Central Sulawesi read, “24 Suspects to be Immediately Arrested”. The provincial police chief, at a news conference in Poso the previous day, standing beside Adnan Aرسال, said force might have to be used if the suspects refused to surrender but he would not say when or how it might happen.⁵⁹ He praised Haji Adnan's “extraordinary efforts” to help negotiate with the families. Haji Adnan said that in principle all the suspects were willing to turn themselves in but they wanted to ensure that the Christians responsible for past violence against Muslims would be prosecuted at the same time.⁶⁰

Two days later, the police struck. Two Densus 88 rapid reaction units of twelve men each, backed by two Brimob units, drove into a street just outside the Tanah Runtuk complex at 6:30 am. Because they used ordinary trucks, the community initially did not realise what was happening. The teams moved quickly on the home of Basri's parents, where their top suspect was believed to be hiding, and on another house on the same street, where a group of suspects was camped out. They did not succeed in arresting Basri but in the second house, they found three men on their list – Dedi Parsan, Anang Mayetadu alias Papa Enal, and Paiman alias Sarjono – as well as Abdul Muis from JI-Palu and a man named Supriady alias Upik Pagar.

According to the locals, Dedi was sleeping on the sofa in the living room. He was shot and then stabbed in his chest and left arm and died on the way to the hospital. Police strenuously deny that he was stabbed but residents say they have photographs of the body. The police claim he resisted arrest and a member of the team shot him in the chest in self-defence. The others in the house were arrested.

In the local version, Ustadz Rian came out of the Ulil Albab Pesantren to see what was going on after he heard gunfire. He had been instructed by Adnan Aرسال to prevent the police from entering the school. As he went to bang on an electricity pole, police shot him in the head. Another teacher, a local man named Ibnu, was wounded. Police say that Rian came out to attack the police with a bomb in his hand and that they have a videotape to prove it, so he was also shot in self-

⁵⁷ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, January 2007.

⁵⁸ “TPM Bantu Nego DPO”, *Radjar Sulteng*, 28 December 2006.

⁵⁹ “24 DPO Segera Ditangkap”, *Radjar Sulteng*, 10 January 2007.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

defence. Because the accounts of the killings of Dedi and Rian are so disparate and both sides are convinced they are right, an urgent and impartial investigation is warranted, a task that could be taken up by a commission of inquiry if one is established to look into the 22 January operations as well.⁶¹

The four men arrested when Dedi was killed and two others arrested outside the Tanah Runtuh area, Imran, 20, and Makruf Zainuri, from Morowali, were flown to Palu.⁶² No top suspect was caught.

The police seized an arsenal from the houses they raided, including an M-16, two other rifles, a revolver and a grenade launcher, some of which they said came from the Philippines; twelve homemade pistols and a homemade rifle; ammunition for all of the above and several homemade bombs, some of them prepared by Sarjono. Under interrogation, Sarjono reportedly admitted to working with Taufik Bulaga to prepare several bomb attacks and providing him with the detonator for the Tentena bomb.⁶³

Vice President Kalla urged the public not to fault the police for the raid because all other measures had been exhausted but a neighbour told the press: "This wasn't a law enforcement operation; this was war".⁶⁴

That afternoon, Dedy Hendra, 21, a policeman from Cianjur, West Java who had been in Poso for about a year, was passing on his official motorcycle with his girlfriend as the burial of Ustadz Rian was taking place. He stopped out of respect for the burial and was beaten to death by the mourners.

On 12 January, the day after the raid, three policemen were wounded in Poso in an unrelated clash with soldiers after a dispute over a woman. The incident underscored the problems of security-force cooperation in the area and made scenarios of individual soldiers inciting locals to attack the police not implausible.

Police continued to surround Tanah Runtuh for the next several days. Over the weekend of 20-21 January, residents reported periodic explosions and outbursts of gunfire.

Early on 22 January, Densus 88 with Brimob reinforcements moved into Pulau Irian Street, site of

the 11 January raid, and the surrounding area. As they did so, shots from within one of the houses killed a Brimob man, Rony Iskandar, and wounded several others. With helicopters hovering overhead, police returned fire. Some men in the houses ran out toward the hills behind Tanah Runtuh; some were shot and others arrested in the process. According to the Indonesian media, operations ended only at sunset.

More detailed accounts will undoubtedly come out in the next few days, but the death toll on the mujahidin and civilian side keeps mounting. At least three of those killed appear to be residents not involved with the mujahidin: Firman, a sixteen-year-old who was running to escape the gunfire; and two men going by on a motorcycle, Aprianto and Humah Aminulah. Two men are reported to have died after being taken into police custody; in one case, that of Basri's younger brother Udin, witnesses who saw the body said it was bruised and bore no gunshot wounds.

Many of the others killed were known mujahidin, although none were on the DPO list. Several family members of DPO suspects were among the dead. So were several mujahidin from other areas. Three men from Ampana, Muhmmad Safri alias Andreas, Om Gam and Ridwan, arrived in Tanah Runtuh on Sunday; all were killed the next day. Another of the dead, a Mujahidin Kayamanya member named Icing, was one of several in the group who stood with the Tanah Runtuh men in a show of solidarity.

More than twenty men were arrested and are being questioned regarding their role. They include two on the DPO list, Wiwin Kalahe and Tugiran. Fourteen dead for two arrests is not an impressive ratio.

⁶¹ "Darah Tumpah Lagi di Poso", *Radarsulteng*, 12 January 2007.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ "4 Kg Kalium Florat & 7 Bom Lontong Tersangka Poso Disita", *Detik.com*, 17 January 2007.

⁶⁴ "Warga Tuding Polisi Lakukan Penyerangan", *Radarsulteng*, 13 January.

IX. POSO DEVELOPMENTS AND JI

Developments in Poso provide some clues to the complex evolution of JI over the last few years.

In the months immediately after Hasanuddin's arrest in connection with the schoolgirl beheadings, it seemed that the Poso *wakalah* was a JI unit that had gone off on its own and was acting more or less independently of the larger organisation. Hasanuddin, after all, had been sent in late 2002 to raise funds and expand the membership but military operations (*amaliyah*) had the potential to set back both. Why then did JI not try to stop them? According to one view, within six months of his arrival in Poso, after the arrests in early 2003 of his immediate superiors in the organisation – notably Nasir Abas – Hasanuddin was in effect left to his own devices. Without direction from the top, he gradually adopted the agenda of his local members: revenge on local Christians.

But several factors suggest some problems with this interpretation. One is the steady stream of teachers (*ustadz*) from JI schools who continued to arrive in Poso long after the 2003 arrests – for example, Rian in 2004 and Sanusi in 2005. There are at least three possibilities, none mutually exclusive: they found Java too hot with the intensity of police counter-terror operations there; they were attracted by a conflict area where some of them had served before and the motivation for jihad remained strong; they were sent by higher-ups in the JI organisation. Hasanuddin may have had a high degree of autonomy but with so many arrivals from Java, it is likely there was at least sporadic communication with senior JI figures.

In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine that Poso would simply be left to its fate as JI weakened. It was too important. From its initial forays in 2000, JI had regarded Poso as fertile territory for expansion, as demonstrated first by the Uhud Project mentioned above, then by the creation of a new *wakalah*. It was seen as a secure base (*qoidah aminah*) in which an Islamic community would be established and then spread outwards. The legitimacy of the jihad against the *kafir* (infidel) enemy there, even after the Malino peace accords, was something that all factions of JI could agree on, regardless of their stance on bombing Western targets.

While revenge on Christians was certainly the local Tanah Runtu agenda, Hasanuddin's adoption of it did not necessarily mean he abandoned broader organisational goals – the high level of motivation undoubtedly facilitated his efforts to marry jihadi

ideology with military capacity. (In this sense, the notion that Poso could ever have been simply the peaceful fund-raising centre that Malaysia was, or that JI had only one agenda, needs some adjustment: one does not keep the fighting spirit high by quietly raising cacao).

Another argument against the notion of an independent cell is the speed with which JI regeneration has taken place. In East Java, for example, every time a *wakalah* leader was arrested, the vacancy was immediately filled, so in quick succession Son Hadi replaced Usman bin Sef alias Fahim in April 2004 and was himself replaced by Ahmad Basyir in July 2004. In Palu, after the arrest of most of the *wakalah* leadership in 2003, Hasanuddin reportedly took over, running both Poso and Palu, whereas the third Central Sulawesi *wakalah*, in Pendolo near the border with South Sulawesi, seems to have maintained its original leadership. With Hasanuddin's arrest in May 2006, new leadership reportedly emerged, with Ustadz Yahya in Poso and another Javanese named Mas Toto taking over in Palu. Yahya's leadership is not confirmed, and not much is known about him, except that he may have trained in Mindanao. But if he has taken over as *wakalah* leader, the question is who appointed him.

The complexity of JI in 2007 is that two or three factions may be competing for influence. One is Noordin Mohammed Top's, now less a faction than a breakaway group that has moved beyond JI, though still dependent on the JI network for shelter. Through Subur Sugiarto, Noordin almost certainly had contact with Sahl and may still be in touch with some of the other Tanah Runtu teachers, but he would be in no position to determine new *wakalah* heads. Noordin's inner circle has also relied on JI and Darul Islam (DI) alumni of a JI-DI training camp in Pendolo. Arman, a DI man who was killed with Azhari in a police operation in Batu, Malang in November 2005, trained there, as did Iwan alias Rois, the field operative in the Australian embassy bombing; Ubaid, the man who served as Noordin's courier; and Jabir, one of his recruiters, who was killed in a police raid in Wonosobo, Central Java in April 2006. It would not be surprising, therefore, if Noordin had established contacts with the current Pendolo *wakalah*.

At the other extreme are JI leaders who are deeply opposed to Noordin and his tactics and are quietly cooperating with – and in some cases receiving funds from – Indonesian authorities in the interests of buying breathing space for the JI organisation to regroup and rebuild.

There is probably a third group still within the JI hierarchy that opposes bombings of Western targets as illegitimate but believes in the desirability of reviving a jihad in Indonesia. For this group, a jihad against *thoghut* forces, starting with the police, would keep salafi jihadi ideology alive, give an immediate rationale for military training, provide a new target and attract mujahidin from outside the conflict areas. Police operations in Poso, if handled badly, could provide just the boost needed. There are some indications that a few of the Tanah Runtuh *ustadz* were thinking along these lines, and it reinforces the need for sustained attention to Poso.

One thing to watch in this regard is whether the three *wakalah* in Poso, Palu and Pendolo act in coordination. If the idea of a jihad against the *thoghut* police is restricted to Poso and does not catch fire in Palu or Pendolo, that would be both another indication of a split in the movement and cause for relief. Any sign of coordination would raise the stakes and the likelihood that the idea of jihad against the *thoghut* government of Indonesia was spreading.

X. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD

The government's new determination to crack down on violent jihadi networks in Poso is welcome but it should not mean that police methods are immune from scrutiny; there is more need than ever for taking measures to minimise civilian casualties and to conduct full and impartial investigations if and when they occur. The risks inherent in forceful action are high, one reason the government has been so reluctant to move against the Poso suspects. Despite the fact that no major bomb attacks took place in Indonesia in 2006, terrorism and terrorist cells have not been eradicated. It is critically important to ensure that Poso does not become the new cause célèbre for the country's mujahidin, this time with an anti-government focus. It is also critical to ensure that men like Basri and Taufik Bulaga are not allowed to continue committing crimes with impunity.

But even as the issue of the remaining fugitives holds centre stage, the government needs to step back and look at how to address the broader causes of ongoing violence in Poso. The arrests of the Tanah Runtuh suspects will be only another chapter in the long conflict unless their families and others affected by the conflict can be offered some hope for the future. The 2001 Malino peace agreement, which included provisions for economic reconstruction, social assistance payments and resettlement of displaced persons, failed in all of the above, largely because of massive corruption. While a new program of economic assistance to households affected by the conflict was announced in November 2006, many in Poso are sceptical that it will be any less corrupt than the programs that preceded it. Locals say that the government too often acts like Santa Claus, sending high officials into the area with cash gifts and other presents and then departing, with no sustained attention or lasting impact.

The Indonesian government should set up a body directly under the president, analogous to the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency for Aceh, with a mandate to document the needs of those who are still displaced and work out an employment program that could absorb the local mujahidin.⁶⁵ The demand to investigate the past conflict will not go away. The government, via a presidential decree

⁶⁵ Crisis Group's recommendations with regard to reintegration of mujahidin in *Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Network*, op. cit., would be a good starting point.

(*Surat Keputusan Presiden*) needs to set up an independent fact-finding body composed of civilian officials, military, police, NGOs and religious leaders – all the stakeholders in a peaceful Poso – to examine grievances left over from 2000-2001. The body should have no limitations on its authority to question those in positions of responsibility during the conflict, both civilian and military, and its hearings and findings should be fully transparent. No one doubts the difficulty or sensitivity of the task, but it is difficult to see how Poso can move forward without addressing the past.

There is no getting around the fact that the men on the police wanted list need to be arrested and prosecuted. But a source told Crisis Group that some of the unmarried mujahidin now in hiding are talking of the need to marry quickly and produce children, so that there will be a new generation to fight on their behalf. Arrests by themselves will not bring peace.

Jakarta/Brussels, 24 January 2007

APPENDIX A



MAP OF INDONESIA



Map No. 4110 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
 January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
 Cartographic Section


APPENDIX B
MAPS OF POSO & MOROWALI DISTRICTS
AND OF CENTRAL SULAWESI PROVINCE



Adapted from the Central Sulawesi Government website: <http://www.jakweb.com/id/sulteng/gov/>

APPENDIX C

MAP OF POSO CITY



APPENDIX D

DPO (WANTED LIST) FROM POSO

No.	Name	Alias	Date, Place of birth	Nationality/ ethnicity	Nature of involvement	Occupation	Education	Family Connections
1	Sahril Lakita	Ayi	25 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso	Indonesian	RELEASED. Suspected of involvement in 2004 bomb explosion at Poso Sports Stadium. Turned himself in December 2006, released a week later, still faces charges			Older brother of Yasin
2	Upik Kokong		25 as of 2006, Bonesompe, Poso	Indonesian	RELEASED. Same case as Yasin and Ayi Lakita. Turned himself in, December 2006, released after one week, still faces charges			
3	Ateng	Marjo	30 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso		RELEASED. Suspected of robbing \$50,000 in district govt. salaries in April 2005. Turned himself in November 2006. Released after one week, still faces charges			
4	Nasir		35 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso	Indonesian	RELEASED. Same case as Ateng, turned himself in November 2006, released after one week, still faces charges			
5	Andi Ilalu	Andi Bocor, Udin	38 as of November 2006	Indonesian	Investigated on suspicion of 2005 shooting of suspected informer, turned himself in 15 November 2006, released after a week, will not be charged	Trader in Poso Central Market		
6	Agus Jenggot	Boiren	28 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso	Indonesian, Bugis-Gorontalo	Poso DPO October 2006, suspected of role in schoolgirl beheadings			
7	Amril Ngiode	Aat	26 as of 2006, Bonesompe, Poso	Indonesian	Suspected in Tentena market bombing, killing of Rev. Susianti	Unemployed	Junior high school	Mother was <i>mualaf</i> (convert to Islam) from Manado

8	Alex (Alek)				From Kayamanya, not Tanah Runtuh-JI			
9	Anang	Papa Enal	40 as of 2006, Tokorondo, Poso		ARRESTED in 11 January 2007 raid; suspected of shooting Rev. Susianti Tinulele with M-16 and 2005 shooting of Hasrin Laturape (suspected informer), Landangan			
10	Ardin	Rojak	35 as of 2006, Lawanga, Poso	Indonesian	From Kayamanya, not Tanah Runtuh-JI. Suspected of involvement in Tentena bomb, May 2005 Poso, also shooting of Susianti Tinulele and shooting at Anugerah church, Palu			
11	Basri	Ayas	30 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso	Indonesian Javanese transmigrant	Suspected of Tentena bomb, killing Pindedapa village head and Susianti Tinulele; shooting at Gereja Anugerah 2004	Gang member; Fish, poultry, vegetable seller		
12	Dede Parsan	Dedi	28 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso	Indonesian Javanese (father is civil servant from Malang)	KILLED in 11 January raid. Suspected of involvement in killing of Poso prosecutor Fery Silalahi	Fish seller	Took university courses in Malang	More than a dozen relatives killed in 2000 massacre; brother of Yudit and Nyole
13	Enal	Ta'o	28 as of 2006	(speaks with a Malaysian accent)	Threw away the heads of the schoolgirls, October 2005; fled Poso area together with Ustadz Sanusi.	Works at Ulil Albab Pesantren		
14	Handara Panil (Hamdara Tahmil Papa Isran)	Papa Yus, Man Labuan	40 as of 2006	Indonesian, Bugis	Role in schoolgirl beheadings			
15	Iin	Brur	28 as of 2006, born in Ampana	Indonesian	Suspected of using revolver to kill Poso prosecutor Fery Silalahi, perhaps involved also in Tentena bomb		High school	

16	Iwan Asapa	Ale	25 as of 2006	Indonesian Bugis	Suspected of killing Poso prosecutor Fery Silalahi; shooting Rev. Ta'joja, treasurer of Central Sulawesi Protestant Church, 2004; killing I Wayan Sukarsa, journalist for <i>Poso Post</i> , May 2001		High school	Brother of Yusuf Asapa, detained with Andi Ipong
17	Kholiq		30 as of 2006	Indonesian Javanese	Hid the knives used in the schoolgirl beheadings	Teaches at Pesantren al-Amanah, Poso		
18	Mujaddid	Brekele	Semarang	Indonesian Javanese	Suspected of involvement in Tentena bomb, Poso and other crimes			
19	Nganto (Nanto)	Bojel	26 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso		Suspected of involvement in schoolgirl beheadings		High school	
20	Rizal (Rijal)	Inong	26 as of 2006, Sayo, Poso		Helped plan murder of Helmi Tombiling, wife of army officer			
21	Sanusi		31 as of 2006	Indonesian Javanese	Gave idea for schoolgirl beheadings as an end-of-Ramadan present	Worked as <i>ustadz</i> (teacher) at al-Amanah Pesantren	Trained in Mindanao	
22	Sarjono	Paiman	30 as of 2006	Indonesian Javanese (trans-migrant)	ARRESTED in 11 January raid; wanted for bombing Poso sports stadium at the Lomba Modero event, 2004			
23	Taufik Bulaga	Upik	29 as of 2006, Lawanga, Poso		Suspected of Tentena bomb and other crimes; known as Poso's Dr Azhari after prominent bomb maker, and "the professor"		High school	
24	Tugiran		25 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso	Indonesian Javanese (trans-migrant)	ARRESTED in 22 January raid; robbery of local government funds			

25	Wahono		26 as of 2006, Sayo, Poso	Indonesian Javanese (trans-migrant)	Suspected of shooting in Sayo Atas, Poso together with Wiwin			
26	Wiwin Kalahe	Tomo	22 as of 2006, Poso		ARRESTED IN 22 January raid; Suspected of beheading three schoolgirls, shooting Ivon and Yuli			
27	Yasin Lakita	Acin	28 as of 2006, Gebangrejo, Poso		Accused in same case as Nasir and Ateng			Older brother of Ayi
28	Yudit Parsan		30 as of 2006		Reportedly helped plan killing of Susianti Tinulele (target was Pdt. Kongkoli)			Brother of Dede
29	Zulkifli							

APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with nearly 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates thirteen field offices (in Amman, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi), with analysts working in over 50 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents. In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sahel region, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia,

Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the Andean region and Haiti.

Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: Australian Agency for International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development Research Centre, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for International Development, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie Corporation of New York, Carso Foundation, Compton Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundación DARA Internacional, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, ProVictimis Foundation, Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors and Viva Trust.

January 2007

APPENDIX F

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2004

CENTRAL ASIA

The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community, Asia Report N°76, 11 March 2004 (also available in Russian)

Tajikistan's Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?, Asia Briefing N°33, 19 May 2004

Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, Asia Report N°81, 11 August 2004

Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy, Asia Report N°85, 4 November 2004 (also available in Russian)

The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia's Destructive Monoculture, Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian)

Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May 2005 (also available in Russian)

Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May 2005 (also available in Russian)

Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Asia Report N°109, 16 December 2005 (also available in Russian)

Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 February 2006

Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report N°113, 10 April 2006

Kyrgyzstan's Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian)

Uzbekistan: Europe's Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, 6 November 2006

Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006

NORTH EAST ASIA

Taiwan Strait IV: How an Ultimate Political Settlement Might Look, Asia Report N°75, 26 February 2004

North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?, Asia Report N°87, 15 November 2004 (also available in Korean and in Russian)

Korea Backgrounder: How the South Views its Brother from Another Planet, Asia Report N°89, 14 December 2004 (also available in Korean and in Russian)

North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?, Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and in Russian)

Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report N°100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean)

China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 September 2005

North East Asia's Undercurrents of Conflict, Asia Report N°108, 15 December 2005 (also available in Korean)

China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean)

After North Korea's Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in Korean and in Russian)

Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available in Russian)

North Korea's Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°56, 13 November 2006

SOUTH ASIA

Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism, Asia Report N°73, 16 January 2004

Nepal: Dangerous Plans for Village Militias, Asia Briefing N°30, 17 February 2004 (also available in Nepali)

Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?, Asia Report N°77, 22 March 2004

Elections and Security in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°31, 30 March 2004

India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir: Steps toward Peace, Asia Report N°79, 24 June 2004

Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector, Asia Report N°84, 7 October 2004

Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan, Asia Report N°86, 10 November 2004

Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections, Asia Report N°88, 23 November 2004

Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Report N°91, 9 February 2005

Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, Asia Briefing N°35, 23 February 2005

Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N°35, 24 February 2005

Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°94, 24 March 2005

The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N°95, 18 April 2005

Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005

Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005

Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report N°101, 21 July 2005

Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005

Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005

Nepal's Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia Report N°104, 27 October 2005

Pakistan's Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Asia Briefing N°43, 22 November 2005

Nepal's New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, Asia Report 106, 28 November 2005

Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role, Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005

Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006

Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing N°46, 15 March 2006

Nepal's Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing N°49, 19 April 2006

Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10 May 2006

Afghanistan's New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia Report N°116, 15 May 2006

India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006

Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report N°119, 14 September 2006

Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006

Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia Report N°123, 2 November 2006

Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report N°124, 28 November 2006

Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report N°125, 11 December 2006

Nepal's Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report N°126, 15 December 2006

SOUTH EAST ASIA

Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report N°74, 3 February 2004

Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?, Asia Report N°78, 26 April 2004

Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon, Asia Briefing N°32, 17 May 2004

Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, Asia Report N°80, 13 July 2004 (also available in Indonesian)

Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas, Asia Report N°82, 9 September 2004

Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, Asia Report N°83, 13 September 2004

Burma/Myanmar: Update on HIV/AIDS policy, Asia Briefing N°34, 16 December 2004

Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy, Asia Report N°90, 20 December 2004

Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report N°92, 22 February 2005 (also available in Indonesian)

Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Case, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005

Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005 (also available in Thai)

Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005

Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also available in Indonesian)

Thailand's Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report N°105, 18 November 2005 (also available in Thai)

Aceh: So far, So Good, Asia Update Briefing N°44, 13 December 2005 (also available in Indonesian)

Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, Asia Report N°110, 19 December 2005

Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian)

Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006

Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006

Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks, Asia Report N°114, 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian)

Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117, 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian)

Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing N°53, 5 September 2006

Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October 2006

Aceh's Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006

Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing N°58, 8 December 2006

OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS

For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:

- Asia
- Africa
- Europe
- Latin America and Caribbean
- Middle East and North Africa
- Thematic Issues
- *CrisisWatch*

please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org

APPENDIX G

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs

Christopher Patten

Former European Commissioner for External Relations,
Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of
Oxford University

Thomas Pickering

Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan,
El Salvador and Nigeria

President & CEO

Gareth Evans

Former Foreign Minister of Australia

Executive Committee

Cheryl Carolus

Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and
Secretary General of the ANC

Maria Livanos Cattai*

Former Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce

Yoichi Funabashi

Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, *The Asahi Shimbun*,
Japan

Frank Giustra

Chairman, *Endeavour Financial*, Canada

Stephen Solarz

Former U.S. Congressman

George Soros

Chairman, *Open Society Institute*

Pär Stenbäck

Former Foreign Minister of Finland

*Vice-Chair

Morton Abramowitz

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey

Adnan Abu-Odeh

Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein
and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN

Kenneth Adelman

Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

Ersin Arioglu

Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, *Yapi Merkezi*
Group

Shlomo Ben-Ami

Former Foreign Minister of Israel

Lakhdar Brahimi

Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Algerian
Foreign Minister

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President

Kim Campbell

Former Prime Minister of Canada; Secretary General, *Club of Madrid*

Naresh Chandra

Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador of India to the U.S.

Joaquim Alberto Chissano

Former President of Mozambique

Victor Chu

Chairman, *First Eastern Investment Group*, Hong Kong

Wesley Clark

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Pat Cox

Former President of European Parliament

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen

Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Mark Eyskens

Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Joschka Fischer

Former Foreign Minister of Germany

Leslie H. Gelb

President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.

Carla Hills

Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative

Lena Hjelm-Wallén

Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister,
Sweden

Swanee Hunt

Chair of *Inclusive Security: Women Waging Peace*; former U.S.
Ambassador to Austria

Anwar Ibrahim

Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia

Asma Jahangir

UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief;
Chairperson, *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*

Nancy Kassebaum Baker

Former U.S. Senator

James V. Kimsey

Founder and Chairman Emeritus of *America Online, Inc. (AOL)*

Wim Kok

Former Prime Minister of Netherlands

Ricardo Lagos

Former President of Chile

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman

Novelist and journalist, U.S.

Ayo Obe

Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy, Nigeria

Christine Ockrent

Journalist and author, France

Victor Pinchuk

Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group

Samantha Power

Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

Fidel V. Ramos

Former President of Philippines

Ghassan Salamé

Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of International Relations, Paris

Douglas Schoen

Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S.

Thorvald Stoltenberg

Former Foreign Minister of Norway

Ernesto Zedillo

Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Crisis Group's International Advisory Council comprises major individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.

Rita E. Hauser (Chair)

Elliott F. Kulick (Deputy Chair)

Marc Abramowitz

Anglo American PLC

APCO Worldwide Inc.

Ed Bachrach

Patrick E. Benzie

Stanley M. Bergman and

Edward J. Bergman

BHP Billiton

Harry Bookey and Pamela Bass-Bookey

Carso Foundation

John Chapman Chester

Chevron

Citigroup

Companhia Vale do Rio Doce

Richard H. Cooper

Credit Suisse

John Ehara

Equinox Partners

Konrad Fischer

Alan Griffiths

Charlotte and Fred Hubbell

Iara Lee & George Gund III
Foundation

George Kellner

Shiv Vikram Khemka

Scott J. Lawlor

George Loening

McKinsey & Company

Najib A. Mikati

Donald Pels

PT Newmont Pacific Nusantara
(Mr. Robert Humberson)

Michael L. Riordan

Tilleke & Gibbins

Baron Guy Ullens de Schooten

VIVATrust

Stanley Weiss

Westfield Group

Woodside Energy Ltd

Don Xia

Yapi Merkezi Construction and
Industry Inc.

Yasuyo Yamazaki

Shinji Yazaki

Sunny Yoon

SENIOR ADVISERS

Crisis Group's Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.

Martti Ahtisaari

(Chairman Emeritus)

Diego Arria

Paddy Ashdown

Zainab Bangura

Christoph Bertram

Jorge Castañeda

Alain Destexhe

Marika Fahlen

Stanley Fischer

Malcolm Fraser

Bronislaw Geremek

I.K. Gujral

Max Jakobson

Todung Mulya Lubis

Allan J. MacEachen

Barbara McDougall

Matthew McHugh

George J. Mitchell
(Chairman Emeritus)

Surin Pitsuwan

Cyril Ramaphosa

George Robertson

Michel Rocard

Volker Ruehe

Mohamed Sahnoun

Salim A. Salim

William Taylor

Leo Tindemans

Ed van Thijn

Shirley Williams

Grigory Yavlinski

Uta Zapf